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HOW DOES THE FEDERAL JUDGE
DETERMINE WHAT IS THE
LAW OF TIE STATE?
Cmwzurs H. GmBs*
These gentlemen from Harvard with whom I find myself
thrown on this panel have preempted all the mysterious and
difficult areas of the subject and left me with a relatively simple
one-that is, how does the federal judge determine what is the
law of the state which he must apply? This, of course, pre-sup-
poses that all other matters have been resolved and that the
federal judge must apply the law of a particular state, whatever
that law is. In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins' Mr. Justice Brandeis said
that the state law to be applied by the federal court was the state
law either declared by its legislature in a statute or by its high-
est court.'
A couple of years following the Erie decision, however, in
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field," the Erie Railroad ran off
the track: The Supreme Court held that the federal courts must
follow and be governed by decisions of a vice chancellor of the
Court of Chancery of New Jersey. This court is one of original
jurisdiction with statewide standing. Its decisions would not
have been binding on the higher appellate courts of New Jersey
nor even on other vice chancellors, nor indeed upon the vice
chancellors themselves who had made the decision if someone
could persuade them in a subsequent case to change their minds.
However, they were binding on the federal courts. This decision
gave rise to Judge Jerome Frank's remark that the federal
judges were now required to play the role of ventriloquists'
dummies to the courts of some particular state.4 As late as 1946
the Sixth Circuit felt obliged to follow an unreported decision of
an intermediate Ohio court even in the face of an Ohio statute
providing that such decisions were not entitled to recognition nor
the official sanction of any court within that state.5
* Sinkler, Gibbs & Simons, Charleston, South Carolina.
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
3. 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
4. Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942).
5. Gustin v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 154 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
328 U.S. 866 (1946).
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Mr. Chief Justice Hughes said in the Fidelity Union case: "It
is inadmissible that there should be one rule of state law for
litigants in the state courts and another rule for litigants who
bring the same question before the federal courts owing to the
circumstance of diversity of citizenship." 6 Upon reflection it is
easy to see that the twin aims of the Erie rule as pronounced in
Hanna v. Plumer7 (decided by the Supreme Court in April of
1965), which are: (1) discouragement of forum shopping and
(2) avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws, are
defeated by Fidelity Union and other similar cases. If A sues
in the New Jersey chancery court and finds that the only rele-
vant state precedent was a previous adverse ruling from another
chancery court of equal standing, that decision would not con-
clude his chance of relief. As a matter of fact, even if A brought
his suit in the very court which rendered the earlier adverse
ruling he might still be able to persuade the vice chancellor to
change his mind. If he should lose, he could appeal and obtain
a ruling from a higher court, and he would not be finally lost
until the highest court of the state had ruled against him. On
the other hand, however, if B made the mistake of bringing his
suit in the federal court or having it removed to the federal
court, he could under these cases find the vice chancellor's deci-
sion an insuperable barrier which he could not refute by argu-
ment or citation of authority from elsewhere because he would
be bound by the vice chancellor's adverse decision. In a third
situation litigant C might select the federal forum purely for the
reason that it would be obligated to apply rules of law which
would not stand up under the attack and re-examination which
they might suffer in a state court. Obviously, a situation such
as this gives rise to forum shopping and defeats the policy of
uniformity which Erie is believed to have required.
In 1948 the Supreme Court relaxed to a great extent the rigid-
ity of the Fidelity Union decision in an opinion rendered in
King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers.8 This was a
South Carolina case in which Mrs. King's husband, a resident
of South Carolina, was the insured under an accidental death
policy which contained a clause exempting the insurance com-
pany from liability if death resulted from participation in avia-
tion. The deceased King was a flight observer in a Civil Air
6. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 180 (1940).
7. 85 Sup. Ct. 1136, 1142 (1965).
8. 333 U.S. 153 (1948).
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Patrol plane which had to ditch thirty miles off the coast of
North Carolina. The plane sank, but King was not seriously hurt
and got out of the plane and put on his life jacket. Two and a
half hours later he was still alive when an accompanying plane
had to leave the scene; however, when he was picked up about
four and a half hours after the ditching he was dead, and the
medical diagnosis was drowning as the result of exposure in the
water. The insurance company claimed that the death resulted
from participation in aviation and refused to pay the policy
benefit. Mrs. King brought suit in the state courts of South
Carolina, contending that drowning was the cause of the acci-
dent rather than participation in aviation. The insurance com-
pany, being an Ohio corporation, removed the cause under the
old 3,000 dollar jurisdictional amount to the federal district
court. The parties agreed that South Carolina law was con-
trolling, but no South Carolina decision was available on avia-
tion exclusion clauses; the district court therefore fell back on
what it considered to be general principles of South Carolina
insurance law including construction against the insurer and
found that the immediate cause of death was drowning and not
avaiation and that therefore Mrs. King was entitled to recover. 9
Two months later in a case brought in the court of common
pleas at Spartanburg County in South Carolina, on another
policy for only 2,500 dollar and therefore non-removable to the
federal district court, the court ruled in favor of Mrs. King on
an almost identical aviation exclusion clause. The insurer did
not appeal this second case. In the appeal from the removed case
the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court's judgment in favor of Mrs. King, saying that
it found nothing in the South Carolina Supreme Court decisions
inconsistent with the view that there was no ambiguity in the
aviation exclusion clause, and that King's death was clearly a
result of his participation in aviation.10 The circuit court ex-
pressed its disbelief that the South Carolina Supreme Court
would have ruled in Mrs. King's favor if her case had been
before it and held that the decision rendered by the court of
common pleas at Spartanburg County in favor of Mrs. King on
the 2,500 dollar policy was not binding on the circuit court as
a final expression of the South Carolina law, particularly since
9. 65 F. Supp. 740 (W.D.S.C. 1946).
10. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. King, 161 F.2d 108 (4th Cir.
1947).
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it was not binding on other South Carolina courts. Oddly
enough, after certiorari was granted, another South Carolina
court of common pleas, this time at Greenville County, rendered
a decision which expressly rejected the reasoning of the Spar-
tanburg common pleas court in the 2,500 dollar policy suit and
espoused the reasoning of the circuit court. The United States
Supreme Court went into some detail in describing the system
of the Court of Common Pleas for South Carolina, emphasizing
that while they are courts of record, their decisions are not pub-
lished or digested in any way and are filed only in the county
of trial where the sole index is by the names of the parties.,
The defendant's attorney was astute enough to obtain from the
chief justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court a certificate
to the effect that under the practice in South Carolina an unap-
pealed decision of the Court of Common Pleas for South Caro-
lina is binding only upon the parties before the court in that
particular case and would not constitute a precedent in any other
case in that court or in any other court in the State of South
Carolina. The United States Supreme Court stated that the
circuit court probably attributed some weight to the Spartan-
burg 2,500 dollar decision but was justified in holding that
decision not controlling and in proceeding to make its own de-
termination of what the South Carolina Supreme Court would
probably rule in a similar case.12 An earlier case was cited to the
effect that a federal court sitting in a diversity suit was in effect
only another court of the state and it would therefore be incon-
gruous to hold the federal court bound by a decision which
would not be binding on any state court.'8 Some importance
was also attributed to the obvious difficulty in researching deci-
sions of the Court of Common Pleas for South Carolina. The
Supreme Court in King was careful to point out that its decision
was not to be taken as promulgating a general rule that federal
courts need never abide by determinations of state law by state
trial courts.14 The second court of common pleas decision-which
came down after certiorari was granted-was not relied upon
by the Supreme Court but used only as an illustration of the
11. King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153, 159-62
(1948).
12. Id. at 160-61.
13. Id. at 161. The Court cited Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945).
14. Id. at 162.
[Vol. 17
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perils of interpreting a common pleas decision as a final or
definitive expression of the South Carolina law.15
The apparently increasing freedom available to the federal
judge for deciding what is the law of the state was suggested
in the 1956 case of Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.16 One of the
questions here was whether a 1910 Vermont decision holding
arbitration agreements unenforcible was binding on a federal
court in 1956. The Supreme Court said that the 1910 decision
was binding, but in so holding it was careful to point out that
there was no confusion in the Vermont decisions, no developing
line of authorities that cast a shadow over the established ones,
no dicta, nor doubts nor ambiguities in the Vermont opinions on
the question involved and no legislative development that prom-
ised to undermine the judicial rule. Obviously, some freedom
must be allowed the federal judge in this area because otherwise
the Erie principle will result in the substitution of one kind of
forum shopping for another. The lawyer whose case depends
upon an old or shaky state court rule which has not been re-
examined for many years would be foolish not to try and ma-
neuver his case into federal court, where, on the purely mechan-
ical administration of the Erie doctrine, the state decision could
not be impeached. It seems to me that the very proper implica-
tion in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic 0o. 17 is that a federal court
is not bound by blind adherence to what is thought to be the law
of the state unless the same is very clearly and recently enun-
ciated by the highest court of that state. The Polygraphic case
indicates that if there is some confusion in the state decisions
and if some shadow is cast over the earlier decisions by develop-
ing authorities or even if there are some dicta, doubts or ambig-
uities in the state decisions, or some legislative development, then
the federal court may re-examine the situation as it were from
scratch and arrive at its own judgment as to what the state
supreme court would do in a given set of circumstances. After
all, this is what lawyers and inferior state judges are doing all
the time; they are making some intelligent estimate as to what
the state supreme court will hold in a given set of facts and cir-
cumstances. This is practising law, but when the federal judge
performs the same function it is a judicial one calling for the
same approach, and he. should not be tied down or hidebound by
15. Ibid.
16. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
17. Ibid.
1965]
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antiquated decisions or outmoded principles. Litigants in federal
courts are not really obtaining a fair trial or even perhaps due
process if they do not receive a full measure of the judicial
function from the federal judge. Like lawyers and lower state
judges, the federal judge in these situations is using his intel-
lectual capacities to discover what the state law is or will be-
not what some particular state judge may have said many years
ago under quite different circumstances. As Professor Wright
has pointed out, however, the federal court must keep in mind
that its function is not to choose the rule which it would adopt
for itself if it were free to do so, but it should choose the rule
which it believes the state court is most likely in the future to
adopt, and base such a choice on all that is known about the
methods of the state court in reaching its decisions.' s
As a general rule the federal judges sitting in a particular
state have practiced before that state's courts and are in a better
position to resolve complex questions of the law of their home
state than other federal judges without this experience. For this
reason some federal appellate courts have expressed reluctance
to substitute their own views of the state law for that of the local
federal judge, but this again, as suggested by Professor Wright,
should not be carried so far as to prohibit the appellate court
from reversing because it thinks the state law is otherwise.' 9
This would involve perhaps treating the question of state law as
if it were a question of fact, but certainly a party should be
entitled to some review of the trial court's determination of the
state law in the same way that he is entitled to review of other
legal questions in the case. A few instances come to mind wherein
a federal judge may in effect seem to be making law but wherein
he would actually be finding what the state law is going to be.
I have reference to recent developments in the field of the viable
fetus and in the area of a wife's right to sue for loss of consor-
tium and in the removal of tort immunity from charitable cor-
porations. These are areas in which somewhat antiquated prin-
ciples of law are gradually giving way to more practical and
modern philosophy and it would not be completely shocking if,
for instance, a federal judge in South Carolina were to hold that
the South Carolina Supreme Court, if presented with the prob-
lem, would allow a wife to sue for loss of her husband's con-
sortium or would allow negligence suits against charitable
18. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs § 58, at 206.
19. Ibid.
[Vol. 17(
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corporations. A good argument can be made for the proposition
that the law is moving in that direction and if the federal judi-
ciary is going to perform its proper function, the judges must
be intellectually free to make this prediction. In a situation
where no clear-cut or even persuasive state ruling on the question
is available, the federal court should exercise its judicial function
upon the basis of other applicable principles of state law or by
reference to general rules of law applied in its best judgment
with reference to decisions in other jurisdictions and the prin-
ciples of the common law.
The state of Florida has gone so far as to authorize certifica-
tion of a question of state law by the federal court to the Florida
Supreme Court;20 other writers have endorsed this idea, but
Professor Moore pessimistically feels that there is little basis
for believing it will be adopted in the near future.21 However,
we heard at this morning's session that the American Law Insti-
tute would probably propose the addition of a new section 1371
to Title 28 of the United States Code which would be tantamount
to allowing certification in some situations.
I close with a piece of wise counsel from Chief Judge Parker
of the Fourth Circuit in a 1949 article in the American Bar
Association Journal :22
In ascertaining the applicable law of the state, we are to
consider court decisions and other available sources of local
law; and we are to apply court decisions in the light of the
well established stare decisis rule and its limitations. We
are not required, however, to speculate as to how the state
court might decide the question before us if it has not al-
ready decided it. Nor should we surrender our own judg-
ment as to what the local law is on account of dicta or the
chance expressions of the judges of the local courts. The
respectful attitude towards the local court, where there has
been no decision on the precise question before us, is to con-
sider that question in the light of the common law of the
state, with a view to reaching the decision which reason dic-
tates, and with the faith that the local court will reach the
same decision when the question comes before it.2
20. FLA. STAT. ANN. §25.031 (Cum. Supp. 1950).
21. 1A MooRE, FaDmtPi. PRAcTIcE g 0.310, at 3332.
22. Parker, Erie v. Tompkins in Retrospect, 35 A.B.AJ. 19 (1949).
23. Id. at 83, Chief Judge Parker quoting from his opinion in New England
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 118 F.2d 414, 420 (4th Cir. 1941).
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